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Of communities and individuals as regards scientific knowledge
The first issue that I will tackle will be the issue of the primary epistemic subject. The thesis 
which I will implicitly be defending will be the following: 
An individual X obtains knowledge of scientific claim p in virtue of being a member of a 
community A that regards claim p as knowledge. 
It  should  be  remarked that  this  claim includes  the  originator  of  claim p,  that  is  the  first  
scientist that will claim p. In other words, what the thesis states is that a claim p only becomes 
scientific  knowledge once  it's  been through a  process  of  validation  by a  scientific  community. 
Hence a four-step procedure may be described, consisting of the following events in chronological 
order: 
A) Individual X asserts scientific claim p. 
B) Individual X proposes scientific claim p to an other person or persons.  
C) Community A, which includes individual X, agrees, (after deliberation) to treat claim p 
as knowledge at which instant it follows that
D) Individual X, as well as the other members of community A, know claim p.
This is meant to be contrasted with the following two-step picture: 
A') Individual X obtains knowledge of scientific claim p through perception or inference.
B')  Individual  members of community X obtain knowledge of scientific  claim p each for 
themselves through their own cognitive capacities supplemented by X's testimony. 
The argument I will present proceeds from the observation of scientific practice and hence 
restricts itself to scientific knowledge, even though in principle it could be extended to other sorts of 
knowledge. 
The strategy that I will follow will be the following. In the first section I will consider the 
claim “that collaboration plays a causal role in advancing scientists' epistemic goals, and that its 
growing popularity  is  a  consequence of  its  effectiveness in  aiding communities  of scientists  to 
realize their epistemic goals”(Wray 2002). I will conclude that the claim is rather weak in the sense 
that it only justifies certain sections of scientific practice and does not establish that in principle 
scientific knowledge is produced in the manner described above. 
An attempt to strengthen the thesis will be made through the presentation of evidence that all 
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through history in what is widely recognised as scientific activity (the activity which claims as its 
originators the methodological writings of Bacon and Newton) the scientist is never alone, even if 
they are the single author of a scientific work. I will draw on certain insights from Latour's (1987) 
study in the making of scientific knowledge to support the thesis that the individual scientist is  
necessarily surrounded by allies. However, as opposed to Latour, I will only focus on the human 
allies. 
This attempt will consist of two parts, the first being what the exploration of what I term the 
intra-laboratory aspect of scientific activity, and the second being the public forum aspect. I will 
conclude  that  the  latter  aspect  is  the  stronger  aspect  in  which  a  claim that  the  production  of 
scientific knowledge in principle contains an irreducible social element, that is that the appropriate 
unit  of  epistemological  analysis  of  the  production  of  scientific  knowledge  is  the  scientific 
community rather than the individual scientist. 
Finally, I will elaborate and discuss the thesis that community agreement is constitutive of 
knowledge, presenting and arguing for the communitarian account of scientific knowledge (Kusch 
2002). I will now begin my account by discussing collaborative work in the sciences. 
Section One – Co-authorship
The most spectacular examples of co-authorship one encounters, and the ones where most 
studies focus on, are papers in the fields of high energy physics or particle physics. Figure one 
represents a sample picture of the first page of a typical paper in high energy physics, which counts 
197  authors  affiliated  with  21  different  institutions.  Massive  collaborations  such  as  this  are 
associated with what several commentators call “Big Science”. Big science projects are costly long-
running experiments run by big groups of scientists.
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 Figure One: A typical co-authored paper in high energy physics
 As Ziman comments as regards such collaborations, “One naturally thinks of high energy 
physics or space science,  where hundreds of scientists  must work together for years around an 
enormous research instrument just to perform a single experiment” (Ziman 2000, p.69). However, 
as  Figure  Two  shows,  “Big  Science”  projects  typically  involving  hundreds  of  collaborators, 
although historically derived from the field of particle physics, are at present not limited to physics,  
with the example below concerning the sequencing of the human genome. 
Figure Two: The author section of the paper on the sequence of the human genome
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Modern scientists working in such collaborations or in stable research groups cite, at least in 
public, the muddling of the issue of individual authorship, as evidenced by the following quotation 
by the 1980 Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry, Paul Berg: “We work as a unit. Very often we cannot 
identify the origin of an idea. It will have been adapted and modified and changed so often, then it 
leads to something else, and finally there is a breakthrough.” (Berg 1980) cited in (Traweek 1992, 
pp.88-89).A distinction that I will build on in the second section, but is worth mentioning here only 
to point to the differing nature of the institution of authorship in different sciences, is that between a  
collaboration  and  co-authorship.  Collaboration,  is  a  broader  term  used  to  designate  research 
activities where communication between scientists takes place, whereas co-authorship seems to be a 
specific reward for a successful collaboration that gets registered and can be traced by bibliometric 
studies.   Laudel  (2002) makes this  careful  distinction between collaboration and co-authorship, 
giving a taxonomy of modes of collaboration, however other commentators seem to equivocate 
between  the  two  terms,  and  even  in  authored  papers  (as  in  Figure  One)  there  is  mention  of 
collaborators  rather  than  authors.  Both  Thagard  (1997) and  Wray  (2002) in  the  philosophical 
literature are guilty of this equivocation, with the latter going as far as talking about collective but 
non-collaborative  research  when  credit  and  responsibility  (I  assume  as  expressed  through  the 
process of publication) are shared amongst the authors  (Wray 2002, p.152). Hence the following 
bibliometric  data  should be read primarily  supporting the thesis  that  co-authorship (rather  than 
collaboration) is prevalent in the sciences.
Cronin (2004) and Cronin et al. (2004) present detailed data, decade by decade, on patterns of 
co-authorship  in   the  literature  of  three  disciplines,  chemistry,  psychology  and  philosophy,  as 
representatives of trends in the natural sciences and the humanities. Over the course of the century, 
the  overwhelming majority  of  articles  in  chemistry  (88%) have  been co-authored,  whereas  the 
respective figures for psychology and philosophy have been 26% and 2% respectively, showing the 
wide  disparity  among  academic  disciplines.  However,  the  picture  changes  dramatically  if  one 
considers data from the end of the nineties: 99% of articles in chemistry are co-authored, compared 
to 77% of articles in psychology and 4% in philosophy  (B. Cronin 2004). This indicates a clear 
overwhelming trend towards co-authorship in the natural sciences. Thagard  (1997) presents data 
drawn from scientific and philosophical journals from the year 1992, where more than 70% of 
papers in Cognitive Psychology, more than 80% of papers in Physical Review Letters, and close to 
90% of papers in  Science  are co-authored, whereas close to 50% of journal papers in  American 
Economic Review and American Sociological Review are co-authored. These data support the claim 
that co-authorship is becoming more prevalent in the natural sciences, as well as in other academic 
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domains. I will now proceed to present a functional explanation of this increase in co-authorship. 
1.1 A functional explanation of co-authorship in science  
Wray (2002) gives a functional explanation in three steps for the prevalence of collaborative 
research in the sciences. In the first step he states that “Collaborative research plays a significant 
causal role in ensuring that scientific communities are able to realize their epistemic goals” (2002). 
By epistemic goals Wray seems to imply simply the production of new knowledge claims. The 
author gives the following five ways in which collaboration significantly helps in the realization of 
scientists' epistemic goals: co-authored papers are cited more often, something which he takes as an 
indication of better quality research, collaborative research enables certain types of inquiry to take 
place, collaboration enables the formulation and development of unifying theories, collaborative 
research  better  ensures  that  data  will  not  be  lost,  high  degrees  of  collaboration  are  partially 
responsible for the rapid growth of scientific knowledge, and finally that collaboration is important 
in the training of young scientists. Wray takes these five ways to be jointly sufficient to support his 
claim, however, I wish to briefly criticise three of these five ways, with my aim being to show that 
this first step is more shaky than it appears.
First of all, it seems that some of the empirical evidence purportedly supporting the first way 
fails  to  perform this  task.  Wray  states,  citing  Hull  (1988,  p.525) that  whilst  of  all  the  papers 
published in  the  journal  Systematic  Zoology  in  1953,  1963 and 1973,  less  than  21% were  co-
authored, 39% of the papers published in the same journal and cited more than 50 times in other 
journals in the period between 1961 and 1983 were co-authored. There are two ways in which this 
claim may fail to support the conclusion that co-authored papers are better quality papers, that is the 
correlation between co-authorship and better quality research may not amount to causation. The 
first is if the number of papers published in general rose, and this coincided with an increase in co-
authored papers. The first can be demonstrated through a rough numerical example. Assume that the 
distribution of papers and co-authored papers was 200 papers out of which 10 were co-authored in 
1953, 350 papers in 1963 out of which 40 were co-authored, and 450 papers in 1973 out of which  
150 were co-authored. This, coupled with the assumption that new research topics are introduced 
after (say) 1973 would make a rise in citations of co-authored papers unrelated to any issues of 
quality.
The second way in which the claim that collaborative research is better quality research may 
be undermined is the simple consideration of the converse claim, that 61% of the papers published 
in the journal and  cited more than 50 in the period between 1961 and 1983 were single-authored. 
The persistence of single-authored papers being the majority of most-cited papers would be more 
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impressive if indeed there was a shift towards more costly research. 
Secondly,  the  development  of  unifying  theories  seems to apply,  as  the author  recognises, 
particularly to cases of interdisciplinary research. However, it is not clear that more collaborations 
are interdisciplinary than not. 
Thirdly, the idea of losing data or ideas seems like a weak premise which does not in principle 
exclude scientists who work on their own, as long as they keep good records. Hence it seems that  
the first step in the functional explanation that Wray offers is suspect.
The second step in his explanation is the claim that “collaborative research persists because it 
is so effective at enabling scientific communities to realize their epistemic goals”. In supporting this 
claim the author alludes to what he terms the context under which the functional explanation he 
provides works, which he sums up in two conditions which are the condition of epistemic equality 
among  the  scholars  involved,  and  the  condition  that  “research  in  the  relevant  fields  generally 
requires  substantial  resources  for  which  there  is  fierce  competition”  (Wray  2002).  The  latter 
condition and its link with “Big Science” projects however ought not to be underestimated, in the 
sense that factors other than the purely epistemic ones, such as sociological pressure and lobbying 
by groups of scientists play a significant role in the allocation of funds that enables large research 
projects to get off the ground. Examples of this is the failure of the Superconducting Super Collider  
(SSC) project and the study by Tournon  (1993) on the European Synchrotron Radiation Facility. 
Hence I conclude that the persistence of collaborative research may be as much a matter of non-
epistemic factors as of its enabling scientific communities to realize their epistemic goals. 
Finally,  the  third  step  in  Wray's  explanation  is  the  claim  that  “Collaborative  research  is 
initially causally prior to the resulting success that it characteristically gives rise to” (2002) . This 
intended to establish the beginning of the chain of mutual  reinforcement  between collaborative 
research and effectiveness in pursuing epistemic goals. The author takes it that it seems implausible 
that the initial cause for collaborative research would be the success of researchers in pursuing their 
epistemic goals separately. However, this can be contested by examples such as the recruitment of 
successful physicists by university departments in order to create powerful collaborations, such as 
described by Galison (1997, sec.4.3), or the mobilisation of top scientists for collaboration in the 
Manhattan Project in WWII, where the separate scientists were invited to the collaboration because 
they were very effective in pursuing particular epistemic goals. 
I  hence  conclude  that  Wray's  functional  explanation  for  the  prevalence  of  scientific 
collaborations is questionable. Furthermore its dependence on  environmental and other local and 
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contingent factors means that at best it can establish that in certain domains of science in a certain 
time-slice (mid-twentieth century to the present)  collaborative science,  particularly as expressed 
through co-authorship, is more successful than individual research in pursuing particular epistemic 
goals,  to  the  point  of  becoming  the  norm.  The  defence  of  collaboration  is  more  a  pragmatist  
vindication  and  defence  of  scientific  collaboration  rather  than  an  epistemic  account  of  the 
production  of  scientific  knowledge that  prioritises  the  group above the  individual  scientists.  A 
stronger argument is needed for the establishment of the latter claim.
Section Two: Presences in the laboratory and in research papers
As  Ziman  remarks,  (2000,  p.4),  arguing  that  science  is  a  social  institution,  “It  (science) 
involves  large  numbers  of  specific  people  regularly  performing  specific  actions  which  are 
consciously coordinated into larger schemes. Although research scientists often have a great deal of 
freedom in what  they  do and how they do it,  their  individual  thoughts  and actions  only  have 
scientific  meaning in these larger schemes”. This quote seems to accurately describe the mode of 
work  of  scientists  working  in  large  “collaborations”  such  as  those  encountered  at  CERN  and 
described by Galison (1997) or by Knorr-Cetina (1995).
Furthermore, from a historian's viewpoint, Shapin provides a detailed study of what he terms 
“the gentlemanly  origins  of  17th century English experimental  and natural  philosophy”  (Shapin 
1994,  p.xviii).  Shapin  situates  17th century  science  in  the  realm  of  civil  conversation  among 
gentlemen, and cites evidence of Boyle's rejection of certain practices as incompatible with the 
practice of such conversation (Shapin 1994, chap.7). 
In  the  above,  two  senses  in  which  science  is  a  social  activity  may  be  discerned.  The 
distinction between these two senses concerns two aspects of scientific practice, what I will term the 
intra-laboratory aspect and the public forum aspect. In what follows I will elaborate on these two 
aspects. I will conclude that whilst the first aspect is not sufficient to prioritise the group over the 
individual as regards the production of scientific knowledge, the second one can fulfil this role. 
2.1 The intra-laboratory aspect of science as a social activity
The intra-laboratory aspect of science as a social activity focusses on the interactions that take 
place among individuals at the time of their induction into the sciences and during their day-to-day 
laboratory work. These interactions may range from interactions with specialised technicians and 
helpers, as in the case of Boyle and his French assistant Papin, or Hooke (Shapin 1994, chap.8), to 
the specialised division of labour taking place in bigger experiments. It is worth remarking that 
specialization in science and division of labour took place early on in science, at the same time as it 
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was becoming it was becoming academicised in nineteenth century Germany (Ziman 1976, pp.59-
60). Such an arrangement, which was essentially a master-apprentice relationship, had as a result 
the formation of a 'school of research', where the students were working on problems selected by 
their professor, adopting their methods and opinions. It is worth remembering that even scientists 
purported to work 'on their own' or who published on their own, usually worked with assistants. It is 
telling  that  even though Galison portrays  the  emulsion expert  Pierre  Demers  and the physicist 
Marietta Blau as 'lone guns' representing an older way of working within physics that was rapidly 
going out of fashion in the interwar years, he does produce evidence that they both worked with 
small teams of assistants and doctorate students (Galison 1997, chap.3). 
My claim would then, as opposed to the criticism that served as conclusion to the previews 
section, is that scientific activity has always been a group activity, rather than this being an accident 
of 20th century practice. However, this claim does not preclude the possibility that certain lines of 
inquiry could at least in principle be open to the individual scientist. Furthermore, as regards the 
production  of  scientific  knowledge,  it  can  still  be  claimed  that  the  individual  that  heads  the 
scientific laboratory or is the first author in a scientific paper still has priority over the rest of the 
authors  or  the  collaborators.  The  head  researcher  is  necessary  to  the  production  of  scientific 
knowledge as described above in a way that the assistants are not. I will, however, now move onto 
the second aspect of scientific work, what I have termed the 'public forum' aspect, which I claim is 
constitutive of scientific practice, and that necessarily links the production of scientific knowledge 
with scientific communities.
2,2 The public forum aspect of science
The second aspect of science which I believe necessarily involves an appropriate community 
into the production of scientific knowledge is that it is primarily a conversation among peers, a 
dialectic  process in  which scientists  attempt to convince their  peers that their  representation of 
nature is the most accurate one. In a real sense of the word, even when  Isaac Newton was locked  
away  in  his  Cambridge  study,  he  was  engaged  in  conversation  with  Gottfried  Leibniz  on 
infinitessimal calculus or Robert Hooke on the nature of light. Ziman, in arguing the constitutive 
role  of  conversation  in  science,  states  that  “Science,  by  its  very  nature,  is  a  body  of  public  
knowledge, to which each research worker makes his personal contribution, and which is corrected 
and clarified by mutual criticism. It is a corporate activity in which each of us builds upon the work  
of our predecessors, in competitive collaboration with our contemporaries”  (Ziman 1976, p.90). 
Hence science, even in its most theoretical guise, is conceived of as essentially a dialogue among 
scholars, both of other times and contemporaries. The social element of science, or at  least  the 
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indirectly social aspect of building on previous work, is reflected in Newton's famous  dictum “if I 
have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants”. By this Newton recognises the 
debt to previous great minds with which he is in a scholarly conversation. 
 The more proximate aspect of this dialogue is often reflected in the letters (e-mails in the 
modern world) and published written articles that scientists use to communicate their findings, as 
well as the conference presentations and scientific colloquia and other gatherings which play an 
increasingly important role as face-to-face communication between scientists, present in the original 
Royal  Society  meetings  (Shapin  1994) is  once  again  becoming  prevalent  through  the  ease  of 
transport  across the globe.  The institution of writing in journals1 helps also helps formalise the 
competitive or argumentative essence of science. Scientists present their work in a public forum and 
thus make it available for criticism and refinement. They engage directly with whoever wants to 
research on the same subject,  by challenging each other to come up with counterexamples and 
counterarguments that would prove them wrong. It is perhaps no accident that the activity that 
Boyle and Newton were engaging in was termed natural experimental philosophy (Shapin 1994), 
that is it was related to the argumentative mode of inquiry of the ancient Greeks, albeit with the 
empiricist restriction that evidence be drawn immediately through the senses and by the questioning 
of nature through experimentation.
2.3 Science as an argumentative activity
In the  same vein  of  viewing science  as  primarily  an argumentative  or  rhetorical  activity, 
Latour  (1987,  chap.1) rather  provocatively  argues  that  in  science  in  action  (or  science-in-the-
making, see Gregory and Miller (2000, chap.6 and 10)) what essentially happens is a mustering of 
opinions and allies, as expressed through the citing of references in a publication. According to 
Latour, when one is arguing for a scientific claim in a publication, rather than being alone they are 
immediately  surrounded by allies  and potential  allies,  which  they  can  mobilise  to  support  and 
strengthen the points contained in the publication. Giving an example, Latour claims that to dispute 
a renowned scientist's claim, one would have to oppose him and his co-workers at the laboratory, 
the university board that gave them the funds to carry on their  research or any other awarding 
bodies that conferred their trust upon the scientist, the journal referees and editors who selected the 
paper for publication, even before moving on to read the paper and look into the scientists' whose 
claims are mobilised to support sub-points in the argument (Latour 1987, pp.31-38). Hence it can be 
concluded that a whole community of people is enrolled in the expression of a scientific claim, 
even if the credit goes to an individual scientist. In a way, the individual is simply the spokesman 
1 Which is contemporaneous with the institutionalisation of science.
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for a large community of people who bestow their  trust upon them, and is  arguing against the 
spokesmen of other communities of scientists who may hold opposing opinions. Furthermore, the 
whole process takes place in front of an attending jury audience who after examining both opinions 
decide, according to commonly agreed standards, on the endorsement of one or the other opinion. It 
is to this audience that I now turn my attention, in an attempt to present a more formal account 
which accords epistemic priority to the community.
Section Three: Communitarianism and collective knowledge
As noted above, in this section I will focus more on the role of the community as validating 
knowledge  claims  that  individuals  may  present  to  it.  Expressing  the  social  and  communicable 
aspects of knowledge that I have gestured towards above, Welbourne (1986, p.5) advances the claim 
that  “Our  idea  of  knowledge,  to  put  it  roughly,  is  the  idea  of  communicable  information, 
information as to the facts, information which is objective in the sense that it is not dependent on 
any particular point of view, but is available to any one at all, with the capacity to understand the 
utterances in which it is embodied”. Welbourne backs up this claim by arguing that one needs to 
contextualise the use of the concepts of belief and knowledge by acknowledging that they have 
evolved hand-in-hand with a certain model of communication of information (1986, p.4).
3.1: The root of the problem: knowledge as individual mental state
Traditional individualistic accounts of knowledge, springing from the Cartesian model of the 
lone  thinker,  tend  to  ignore  Welbourne's  point  about  the  significance  of  communication  in 
knowledge acquisition. This is further enhanced by the reductionist position as regards testimony as 
a source of knowledge. This position takes testimony not to be among the standard basic sources of 
knowledge,  which  are  taken  to  be  memory,  perception,  reason  and  introspection.  Modern 
proponents of such a position are van Cleve  (2006) and Audi  (2006). Supporters of this position 
focus their criticism on arguing that the justification of testimonial claims has a non-testimonial 
basis (Goldman 1999, p.126). 
Two further claims add to the downgrading of testimony and of communication in general as 
regards knowledge acquisition. The first is the idea that knowledge is somehow “denatured”in the 
process  of  communication  (Welbourne  1986,  p.49).  Welbourne  explains  that  the  received view 
claims that there is some loss of understanding of some crucial elements required for a claim to 
count as knowledge during the transmission from speaker to hearer. Welbourne gives the example 
of John Locke (1975) as an early proponent of such a view2.
2 Cf. (Locke 1975) “In the Sciences, every one has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: What he believes  
only, and takes upon trust, are but shreads; which however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to  
10
 The second is the insistence on knowledge being primarily resident inside the brain/mind, that 
is of knowledge being primarily a mental state. This assumption seems to go unchallenged and 
taken for granted by most epistemologists. A particularly pertinent example is social epistemologist 
Alvin Goldman, who, even though he sketches his project as seeking “social paths or routes to 
knowledge” (1999, p.4), he intends that to mean that “considering believers taken one at a time, it  
(his  project)  looks  at  the  many  routes  to  belief  that  feature  interactions  with  other  agents,  as 
contrasted with private or asocial routes to belief acquisition”(Goldman 1999, p.4). He furthermore 
elucidates this by maintaining that “Even in this second perspective, (the social one), however, the 
knowing agents are still individuals” (Goldman 1999, p.4) 
The commonly-held view is that possessing knowledge is a mental state, either in virtue of 
being a species of belief or in virtue of being a separate but nonetheless mental state3, and that 
furthermore mental states are primarily (if not only) reducible to individual brain states. Such a 
thesis may be found to underlie the dialectic of epistemological writings of writers such as Dretske 
(1991) and is prevalent in Fodor's proposals and defence of the Language of Thought Hypothesis, in 
which he comes out in favour of a strong Cartesianism (2008, p.12).
Margaret Gilbert lays down two theses, which taken together explain the prevalining tendency 
to locate knowledge within individual's brains and preclude the possibility of group belief. These 
two theses she labels as psychologism about belief and anti-psychologism about social groups (M. 
Gilbert 1992, p.238). The first thesis is taken to reflect the idea that only a being with a mind can  
have an attitude towards a proposition, such as a belief. The second thesis is meant to block appeals 
to such entities as group minds4, hence it simply conveys the idea that social groups do not have 
minds.
A general  criticism for  such individualistic  accounts  is  that  they overstate  the role  of  the 
individual mind by considering a lone thinker in the universe, that is they assume that individual 
mental states are necessary and sufficient to explain individual action, where what at best can be 
established, at least as regards everyday tasks, is only that individual mental states are necessary in 
causal explanations of action. 
My argument as regards this claim is that a great number of actions can be only be sufficiently 
explained by supplementing the analysis in terms of mental states with  considerations of rule- and 
norm-following or other activities which have an ineliminable social element5.  Hence I conclude 
his stock, who gathers them.”
3 Williamson claims that knowing that p rather than believing that p is a basic mental state. (1995; 2000)
4 It should be noted, nonetheless, that functionalists about minds, such as Williamson, would not in principle preclude 
the possibility of group minds. 
5 A strong thesis would ground rule-following on the community, see  (Kusch 2002, chap.XIV), however a weaker 
thesis acknowledging that  a  lot  of  our behaviour consists of  mimesis  of  past  reactions of our peers  in similar 
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that in such situations mental states alone6 are not sufficient to explain behaviours observed.
From a purely epistemological point of view, the appeal of the idea that the possession of 
knowledge is a purely individual mental state may be derived from the widely-held belief that it is 
perception and inference that  are  the basic  sources that  generate knowledge, with memory and 
testimony regarded as merely transmitting knowledge (however see the discussion in (Lackey 2005) 
for a defence of the claim that memory is a generative source of knowledge).  Regarding sense 
perception and inference as the only basic  means of generating knowledge has as a  result  that 
knowledge acquisition is treated as more or less instantaneous, in the sense that an epistemic subject 
a comes to acquire knowledge that  p as soon as a becomes aware of or grasps p, as described in 
figure 3. 
Figure 3: “Instantaneous” knowledge acquisition 
My claim is that this schema is an oversimplification of knowledge acquisition and does not 
hold for most cases of knowledge acquisition. However, before proposing an alternative schema 
that  regards knowledge acquisition as  a  process  spread out in  more time-slices  than the above 
schema, I will briefly digress into an account of belief such that could allow for plural epistemic 
subjects but would also maintain the view of knowledge as justified true belief7.  
In the following section, I will give non-mental interpretation of belief that would allow one to 
keep the traditional  formulation of knowledge as justified true belief  but nonetheless cast  it  as 
inherently  social.  This  attempt  is  based  on Gilbert's  (2000) definition  of  belief  based  on joint 
commitment. In the final section I will elaborate on Kusch's (2002) more detailed account of the 
situations would be sufficient. 
6 Even states that Williamson labels as 'factive', which are states (or attitudes)  that one has “if and only if, necessarily,  
one has it (them) only to truths” (2000, p.34) would not be sufficient to explain action taking place within a social 
environment. Considerations of Robinson Crusoe-like examples would be unsuitable as counter-examples as it is an 
open question whether congenital social recluses would reason and act in the same way as social beings would. 
7 See (Rolin 2008) for a defence of scientific knowledge as collective knowledge, with knowledge meaning justified 
true belief or acceptance held by groups as plural subjects (in Gilbert's sense)
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t1
P obtains
t2
A grasps P
(or becomes aware of P)
A knows that P
mechanism of the generation of knowledge through testimony.
3.2: Belief as a property of plural subjects
Gilbert  (1992),  (2000) proposes an alternative account of belief that sidesteps the problems 
that  acceptance  of  these  two  theses  would  cause,  by  proposing  and  defending  an  account  of 
collective belief as jointly accepted view, whereby the term joint acceptance does not entail that any 
subset  (even composed of  one person)  of  the  group consists  solely by individuals  individually 
holding the belief. In other words, Gilbert stresses that her account is non-summative, that is the 
joint acceptance of the view does not reduce to the sum of the beliefs of the group members  (M. 
Gilbert 1992, p.306). Gilbert gives the following formulation of her account of collective belief: 
“There is a collective belief that p if some persons are jointly committed to believe as a body 
that p. These people can then accurately say of themselves that “We (collectively) believe that p.” 
(M. Gilbert 2000, p.38)
In explicating the notion of joint commitment Gilbert stresses the fact that it does not reduce 
to personal commitments, and that furthermore it cannot be rescinded by any of the parties to it 
acting unilaterally (M. Gilbert 2000, p.40). 
There are two main advantages to be gained from adopting Gilbert's notion of collective belief 
and  the  derivative  notion  of  collective  knowledge,  defined  simply  as  justified  true  belief  or 
acceptance held by groups of people considered as plural subjects (Rolin 2008). The first is that it 
provides a definition of knowledge in line with more standard definitions in terms of justified true 
belief,  whilst  at  the  same time taking into account  the  arguments  of  the above sections  which 
purport to show that scientific knowledge is the property of plural subjects. The second advantage is 
that in using the language of joint commitments, Gilbert is in line with the communitarian account 
of  knowledge  to  be  defended  below.  According  to  this  view,  as  elaborated  in  (Kusch  2002), 
knowledge is a social kind, like money, and the status of the possessor of knowledge as regards a 
certain claim p is simply a nexus of obligations and commitments held by a community of people 
towards the claim that p. 
A disadvantage of Gilbert's account is that it does not explain the exact relationship between 
individual brain states and group states. The question of whether the group state of belief that p 
supervenes on individual states is unaddressed whilst the notion of belief is replaced with the notion 
of  commitment,  where  the  status  of  the  latter  as  a  behavioural  trait  or  a  mental  state  is  left 
unexplained. This however need not affect the communitarian account to be presented below, since 
the purpose of the account is to shift the unit of epistemic analysis as regards scientific knowledge 
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to the community rather than the individual, rather than give a complete mechanism of how and if 
the  group  states  reduce  or  relate  to  individual  mental  states.  The  latter  endeavour  is  deemed 
irrelevant, since the stance followed is that focussing on group behaviour has more explanatory 
power in analysing the production of scientific knowledge than focussing on individuals' cognitive 
capacities and faculties.
I will close this section by elaborating on the communitarian schema of belief acquisition by 
contrasting it to figure 3. 
3.3: Knowledge acquisition according to communitarian epistemology 
As hinted in the conclusion of section 3.2, knowledge acquisition of ordinary claims is not 
described accurately by figure 3, which describes only special cases of acquisition of knowledge 
through perception or through solitary inference8. Given that most of our knowledge is acquired 
through  testimony,  and  given  the  importance  of  communication  stressed  throughout  the  above 
sections, a more complete schema of knowledge acquisition would drive a wedge between the time 
of grasping that a state of affairs obtains and being justified in attributing knowledge to the subject, 
only attributing knowledge when a community of people is formed. Such an account is given in 
figure 4, which is copied from (Kusch 2002, p.72)
Figure 4: Knowledge production in case of constative testimony (copied from (Kusch 2002, 
8 However there is a case to be made to the conclusion that inference is based on rule-following, and hence, if one 
accepts the communitarian interpretation of rule-following, then would not be available to the social isolate. 
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p.72))
My claim is that the above schema does justice to the arguments presented above, as to the 
constitutive  role  of  community  validation  (sections  1  and  2)  in  the  acquisition  of  knowledge. 
Furthermore, it does justice to the idea entertained more formally in section 3 that the epistemic 
subject is the group and the individual is a becomes an epistemic subject as regards a proposition p 
only in virtue of there existing a community which accepts p as knowledge. This is demonstrated in 
the schema by the events taking place at t4, where a community is formed and at the same time, and 
only then can the two people forming that community, a and b, be said to know that p. 
Finally, it is worth remarking that knowing that p as described in figure 4 and as proposed by 
communitarian  epistemology,  consists,  as  noted  above,  of  a  nexus  of  commitments  and 
entitlements, and hence the content of the concept of knowledge may vary from group to group, 
hence the definition of knowledge proposed is compatible with more formal, traditional definitions 
of knowledge, as long as the traditional definitions of knowledge do not wish to cast knowledge or 
belief as purely mental properties. In what follows, I will attempt to further illustrate the concept of 
knowledge  in  communitarian  epistemology  through  scientific  practice,  by  focussing  on  the 
phenomenon  of  “distance  lending  enchantment”  as  applied  to  the  production  of  scientific 
knowledge. 
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